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The current debate over the propriety of displaying the Confederate flag in public places 
and its incorporation in state flags has stirred a renewed debate over the true causes and 
meaning of the Civil War. To those who see the war as having been primarily about the 
preservation of the institution of slavery, the flag is a symbol of racism and an affront to 
those who believe in protecting the civil rights of all Americans. To those who view the 
war as having been a struggle for the preservation of states' rights, it symbolizes the 
heroism and sacrifice of southern patriots. Charles B. Dew is alert to the relevance his 
research will have on this debate. He acknowledges the fact that there are divergent points 
of view on this issue by relating how the Immigration and Naturalization Service treats the 
question on its citizenship examination. As a response to the question 'The Civil War was 
fought over what important issue?', the INS will accept either slavery or states's rights as 
the correct answer, the only question where two answers are possible. The author then 
goes on to show that his research indicates that only one answer is truly correct, and that 
answer is slavery. 
The primary focus of Dew's study is on the rhetoric of southern leaders in the period 
leading up to actual hostilities. This is an area that has received scant attention in most 
histories of the war. In the cases of Jefferson Davis and his vice-president Alexander H. 
Stephens, their post-war assertions that secession had been motivated by concerns for 
states' rights are shown to be inconsistent with the views they stated previous to the 
outbreak of hostilities. Stephens was particularly strident in his defense of the peculiar 
institution. On March 21, 1865 he stated that '. . . its (the new Confederate government) 
foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to 
the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural moral condi- 
tion.' Jefferson Davis said that 'slavery was an institution that "a superior race" had used to 
transform "brutal savages into docile, intelligent, and civilized agricultural laborers".' The 
book then moves on to its particular purpose: to examine the public statements of a group 
of men appointed as commissioners by the slave states of the Deep South - Mississippi, 
Alabama, South Carolina, Georgia, and Louisiana. In all there were 52 such commis- 
sioners. Their job was to travel to other slave states to explain the rationale for secession. 
They spoke to state legislatures, conventions, and public meetings. 
Mississippi was the first state to act. On November 30, 1860 the state legislature author- 
ized the governor to send commissioners to all other slave states. Alabama's governor 
followed suit in early December because the Republicans were intent on 'the destruction 
of the institution of slavery.' In both cases, the commissioners were bi-partisan, with both 
Democrats and Whigs appointed. Lincoln's election had caused political opponents to 
close ranks, and it was the issue of slavery that united them. A typical example of the ra- 
cially-charged and incendiary nature of the commissioners' addresses would be the speech 
given by William L. Harris, Mississippi commissioner, to the state legislature of Georgia. 
'The new administration coming to power on March 4 promised "freedom to the slave, but 
eternal degradation for you and us".' 'Our fathers made this government for the white man, 
rejecting the negro as ignorant, inferior, barbarian race, incapable of self-government, and 
not, therefore, entitled to be associated with the white man upon terms of civil, political, or 
social equality.' The Georgia legislature passed a resolution condemning the Republicans 
as '. . . organized . . . for the avowed purpose of destroying the institution of slavery, and 
consequently spreading ruin and desolation among the people in every portion of the states 
where it exists.' Judge Handy, a Mississippi commissioner, said to an audience in Mary- 
land that the Republicans threatened 'the right "by which one man can own property in his 
fellow man".' 'Slavery was ordained by God and sanctioned by humanity.' In speech after 
speech, the commissioners made it clear that slavery was the fundamental issue that 
prompted the slave states to secede. 
As the first state to secede, South Carolina was among the first to take the initiative in 
appointing commissioners to represent its views in other slave states. South Carolinians 
felt vulnerable as theirs was the only state to have seceded and was eager to have other 
states join. Its commissioners were quite consistent in the rhetoric they employed. They 
invariably referred to the 'Black Republicans,' and made slavery their most important 
argument. South Carolina was careful to choose commissioners who had originally come 
from the states where they were to be sent in order to enhance the chances of a warm 
reception. In addition to inducing other states to secede, South Carolina wished to dispel 
the notion that it had acted in a precipitate manner, but had no other alternative as a result 
of Lincoln's election. They also hoped to bring together a Confederate constitutional con- 
vention as quickly as possible. They pushed for Montgomery, Alabama as a site that was 
central and well-connected with rail lines. 
Alabama soon followed South Carolina's lead. With all of the Deep South out of the 
Union, it was imperative that they bring as many other slave states along with them as pos- 
sible. On his mission to Kentucky, commissioner Stephen Fowler Hale warned against 
waiting for direct Union aggression, stating that Lincoln's election was already such an 
act. In a letter to the state's governor, he justified southern secession by beginning with 
slavery. He wrote that slavery was 'an institution with which is bound up not only the 
wealth and prosperity of the Southern people, but their very existence as a political com- 
munity.' He went on to state that, through secession, Kentucky had bright prospects, but by 
remaining in the Union it would suffer the humiliation of racial equality and risk the fate of 
Santo Domingo. Although he did not succeed in persuading Kentucky to concede, his 
focus on the question and racial comments were consistent with those of the other com- 
missioners. 
Virginia was considered to be the key to Confederate chances of success against the 
Union. Its industrial base, population and wealth were essential to a prospective southern 
war effort. The state's status as the home of so many founding fathers and presidents 
would magnify the importance of its secession. Virginia's secession was never a foregone 
conclusion, and the commissioners' appeals alone were not enough to induce the state to 
do so. At the time of the Virginia Convention in February 1861, only forty of the one hun- 
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dred and fifty-two delegates were outright secessionists. It took the battle at Ft. Sumter to 
bring the issue to a head. The three commissions to the Virginia Convention harped on the 
theme of slavery. They insisted that the Republicans would stop at nothing to destroy the 
institution. The arguments they used did not focus on the economic impact of abolition, 
but on the cultural and social results. They painted a lurid picture of race war and misce- 
genation. The slave revolts of Santo Dorningo and Haiti were given as examples of the fate 
that would befall Virginia if it remained in the Union. A key issue in Virginia was convin- 
cing its residents that secession by the states of the Deep South was irrevocable. Many in 
Virginia still held out hopes of reconciliation, and disabusing them of that notion was crit- 
ical to the success of the commissioners' mission. 
Like Jefferson Davis and Stephenson, the post-war statements by the commissioners 
were of an entirely different flavor and tenor than those they had made during the fateful 
months leading up to war. When John Smith Preston, one of the commissioners who spoke 
at the Virginia Convention, talked about the Confederate cause after the war, there was no 
reference to be found about his pre-war statements about slavery. He claimed that the war 
had been a noble fight for the preservation of states' rights. Nowhere did he repeat his pre- 
war claim that 'the South cannot live without African slavery.' Another commissioner, 
Jabez L. M. Curry, said after the war 'The object of quitting the Union was not to destroy, 
but to save the principles of the Constitution.' He neglected to mention that when speaking 
in Maryland he had asserted that they should secede to achieve 'deliverance from Aboli- 
tion domination.' The commissioners had repeatedly hammered home three main reasons 
for secession, which seem to have been purposely forgotten after the war. The first fear 
they preyed upon was the fear of racial equality, stating that emancipated slaves would be 
able to out-vote southerners. The second fear was that of race war, where the slaves would 
rise up to destroy their white owners as they had done in the Caribbean. The third fear, and 
perhaps the worst, was the racial mixing which would follow in the wake of emancipation. 
Contrary to their post-war assertions that it had been states' rights that had been at stake, 
their pre-war rhetoric seems singularly focused on the issues of slavery and race. 
Apostles of Disunion makes a convincing case for slavery as the prime motivation for 
southern secession. The only complaint that might be made concerns the book's brevity. 
Minus appendices and index it covers only 81 pages. Although the evidence presented is 
compelling, there could have been more of it. There were 52 commissioners in all, and we 
are not told anything about most of them. It would have been interesting to see if their rhet- 
oric was consistent with that which is cited. Also, the activities of the commissioners are 
not detailed enough in all the slave states. This would have been worth going into more 
depth. What we are told, however, does shed light on a too-long neglected aspect of the 
Civil War. It also serves to warn against uncritically accepting states' rights as having been 
the true issue at stake when most of the slave states decided to secede from the Union. 
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